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Mr. Makins  
(ii) Mr. Lyle (82/15/11)

(iii) Enter 17/12  
(copying action  
is being  
taken on spec  
copy)

Ref. our tel. 938 of 28 November

With the compliments of

CHANCERY

W  
4/12

Apologies for inflicting such a huge  
document upon you - But you only  
have to read it, we had to translate  
it!

John Guter 1/12/70.

BRITISH EMBASSY

P.O. BOX 87

AMMAN

(Copy sent to Mr. G. King  
USK (broad))

W  
17/12



Text of King Hussein's Letter  
to Arab Heads of State

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No. 10

Various nationalistic factors have prompted me to send you this letter, the most important of which are:-

NEM 3/414/1

(a) The dictates of the responsibilities and burdens which I bear - and here there has been a constant concern on my part to rely upon frankness and clarity in exchanging views with my brother Arab leaders, in everything that benefits our nation and its great causes, in particular the Palestine cause.

(b) A constant concern on my part not to take up inflexible positions in isolation on important matters, whether this be isolation in receiving information from any foreign or Arab movement concerning these matters, or isolation in issuing decisions, and then deciding attitudes as a result of information or inclination, concerning one matter or another - something which concerns us all in our great Arab world.

Perhaps it would be useful if before anything else I reminded you of a basic historical fact about this Arab country of mine - the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan - formed over 50 years ago. There is no doubt that the founding of the kingdom by my late grandfather, King 'Abdullah bin Hussein as an Emirate known at that time as Transjordan, saved this area from Balfour's promise and removed it from the danger area produced by this promise in setting up the so-called Jewish National Home in the heart of the Arab world. | 1920

The message of the Great Arab Revolution, and its call for the unity of the Arab nation, has remained the cornerstone of Jordan's political ideology and political action from the beginning. Palestine, and the Zionist danger that descended upon it, has remained in the forefront of the concern and matters which have confronted the state of Jordan since its foundation and then got the better of most of its ideology and its political and military action. This is quite apart from the well-known honourable position upon which the Great Arab Revolution stood regarding all the attempts to take Palestine away from the Arab nation and the Nile from the legal rights of its people. This is a position which Jordan has inherited, protected and maintained and the faith in the nationalist message that it had received from the Great Arab Revolution. [LAST PAPER]

Going on from and in the light of these facts, the position of Jordan in the Arab-Israel war of 1948, and the sacrifices of heroism of her army, despite the meagreness of her abilities and power at that time, was what enabled us to save that dear part of dear Palestine, known from then on as the West Bank of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Then there is the position of Jordan resulting from that war, when she opened her arms and her heart to receive thousands of Palestinians driven from their homes by the arrogant Zionist forces, and the sacrifices of her people which prompted them to divide their

/livelihood



lif

livelihood with their brother immigrants, despite the complex economic problems that they faced and under which they suffered. Finally, there is the attitude of Jordan regarding the Israeli aggression which fell upon the Arab nation, beginning with the attack upon the sister United Arab Republic on the morning of 5 June 1967, and the haste made by Jordan, believing in the unity of the (Arab) nation and of destiny, to enter the heart of the battle of honour beside her great sister, making light of the sacrifices however great; and of the losses and consequences however serious or extensive. This was despite all the indications warning of an evil outcome, because of the lack of extensive Arab planning and the lack of preparation prior to confronting the danger and the knowledge of its extent throughout the Arab nation in the period before the battle. I personally had warned against the result of the absence of all this for a long time ..... (? and my appeals went unheard).

I come now to the heart of the subject which I wish to place before you for our joint consideration, to link it directly with our sacred cause and our common destiny:-

(1) Suggestions are repeatedly being made (and their originators are heard clearly) coming apparently from some of the great powers that a Palestinian state be set up to comprise, as we understand it, a great part of the West Bank of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and not the whole of the Bank and the Gaza Strip, as part of a comprehensive settlement and an end to the Palestine problem, and as a condition for reaching such a settlement.

(2) Some Palestine Resistance circles say that this suggestion has met with tangible enthusiasm on the part of some Arab states and that this suggestion, in the view of these states, constitutes an appropriate formula to assist in achieving a solution or a way out of the deadlock of the Palestine problem.

? (3) There is available to the Jordanian authorities information that a number of sister Arab states have been in touch with the Great Powers and have conveyed to them their agreement in principle to the setting up of the proposed Palestine state or the setting up of a Palestine government in exile, or similar formulae, and their approval of the idea; and that some of them have suggested to one or more of the great powers mediation to persuade the international emissary Gunnar Jarring to begin contacts with the Palestinians and hold discussions with them within the scope of his discussions with the Middle East states concerned.

(4) The atmosphere echoes with all this in the West Bank of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, with the serious attempts that have occurred up to now deriving from the West Bank, some of which spring from initiatives of the Israeli enemy, and others of which it appears spring from various Arab initiatives.

/5. What



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5. What attracts notice is the correspondence appearance and timing between new explanations of Security Council Resolution No. 242 of 22 November 1967, which say that the Resolution gives the international emissary the right to contact the Palestinians and hold discussions with them, and the appearance of division in official Arab opinion in the voting upon the recent Afro-Asian draft resolution in the General Assembly of the United Nations.

In face of all the obscurity in the Palestine problem springing from the aforementioned facts and information, and of the anxiety it indicates in the whole Arab conscience, not least in Jordan, the feeling of danger which threatens us not just today, but which has always threatened us in proportion to our involvement in Palestine, its cause and its people, threatens similarly and at the same time our Arab nation, its future and its destiny. We in Jordan did not for one day look at the matter with eyes greedy for gain or riches; we have simply been involved in it in life and in destiny, we have paid a price for this over the years in sweat and vigilance and tears, in great numbers of martyrs and sacrifices, and besides all this, we in Jordan have the following observations:-

(1) We in Jordan stand along the longest - and hence the most dangerous - confrontation line with the enemy.

(2) Jordan and Palestine are linked in their people and their destiny. Jordan, when it works to regain the West Bank and the rest of the lands occupied by the enemy in June 1967, fully appreciates that the enemy clings to Palestinian national territory and Jerusalem and the West Bank in particular more strongly than she clings to Arab territory outside Palestine from which, we reckon, she might sooner or later not object to withdrawing.

(3) Jordan, by virtue of its existence, is the home of the Palestinian emigrants, and by virtue of the strategic nature of its geographical position and the fact that it stands along the longest confrontation line, is the enemy's chief target. Jordan remains among the most important element affecting the enemy to the extent that she receives the Arab moral and material support that she requires.

(4) The history of the Palestine problem is full of evidence to show that Arab position has always come to accept what it had previously rejected. Examples of this go back prior to the resolution partitioning Palestine, and proceed via the partition resolution itself and what followed it, then via the Security Council resolution 242 concerning the June 1967 disaster and the acceptance of it and of the dictates of reality.

This peculiarity of the Arab position drives us to many calculations and produces in us a grave anxiety. The enemy in facing the world pressures applied to it must pick on Jordan as a target by a variety of means, especially by

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destroying her national unity, by weakening her and exhausting her, preparatory to creating a suitable climate for finishing her off and creating a new situation within her, and then reducing most of what Jordan is at present demanding and striving to achieve, in the way of regaining the West Bank including Jerusalem and the rest of the occupied Arab territories in execution of Security Council resolution 242. In the enemy's view, and in our judgement and the light cast by the history of the Palestine problem, the Arabs will accept this as has been their wont in the past. Perhaps the enemy will then concentrate on a final liquidation of the problem by converting the East Bank and that part of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip from which withdrawal proceeds into a state in which the Palestinians can settle, and will do business with it, and will proceed thus into doing business with the states of the Arab East, by virtue of the strategic position of the East Bank deeper in the heart of the Arab homeland, what damage does it do to the enemy if the tragedy which befell the Palestinians when their land and their homes were taken away from them was repeated and befell the Arab people here in this brave part, and to the Arabs behind them everywhere.

(5) The Palestine Resistance Movement has remained and will remain a part of us. We have protected this movement, and have for a long time refrained from revealing the dangerous negative attitudes which it concealed in the hope that it would reform itself. But, because of this restraint and as a result of misunderstanding or superficiality, or because of the existence of views and objectives of which we are ignorant but would like to know about and reveal their dimensions, matters in our Arab world have reached a stage for which we reckon the enemy was planning in the face of our continuous sacrifices, our persistent bravery and refusal to yield to the surrender that the enemy wants. Thus was the enemy's planning completed and Arab material and moral pressures started to act at the expense of Jordan's capability to build her strength or to continue doing so. The result was the progressive weakening of Jordan's national unity, and it is this that we will resist with all our power and ability.

In the face of all this, and of the dark shadows of the present situation and the anticipated future, I ask permission of my brother to re-affirm the following:-

(a) The Jordan Government's acceptance of the Security Council's Resolution No. 242 of 22 November 1967 was not a step taken in isolation by the government, but was consistent with the resolutions of the Arab summit conference in Khartoum and within the framework of unified Arab opinion. It was left to the UAR and Jordan to act in other fields to erase the traces of the June 1967 aggression.

(b) The acceptance by the Jordan Government of what is called the "Rodgers initiative" or the "Rodgers proposals" was consistent with the attitude of the UAR

/towards

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towards it, and a confirmation of Jordan's adherence to unity of political action with the sister UAR, which forms part of the unity of struggle of the two countries and of the Arab nation with its unity in destiny and aims, in which the UAR stands as the strongest, just as it stands with Jordan in the vanguard of the ranks facing danger and aggression.

(c) The initial Jordanian conviction concerning the Palestine problem was that it was a national [i.e. pan-Arab] matter which no Arab state could separately solve or settle. It is a conviction born of belief in the national nature of the battle against the common Zionist enemy, although this sacred identity of the cause and the battle does not prevent there being a rôle for the Palestinian people in the Arab-Zionist struggle, the rôle of vanguard and spearhead.

(d) Discussion of the right of the Palestinian people to the usurped land is one thing; the definition of their struggling rôle to regain that right is something else. While Jordan sees that the Palestinian people have the full and undiminished right to their homeland and to self-determination, Jordan also regards it as neither courage nor sacrifice to leave the Palestinian people on their own to face Israel and World Zionism, whether with a state or without one. Apart from all this, Jordan regards it as disgraceful that the Arabs should help their enemies to ignore resolutions of the U.N., which form a reasonable guarantee for the rights of the Palestinian people, to duck the responsibility which these resolutions impose upon the enemy, and to resort to fantastic solutions which this time will be at the expense of the Arab people in Jordan and of the Arab nation in its great homeland.

(e) We have announced more than once our determination to invite the Palestinian people to determine their future by themselves when we arrive with them and our brothers at the dawn of liberation. We have affirmed that we will accept and bless and support the decision of the people and their choice of the method system and make-up of government and the extent of their relations with the state in Jordan and other sister Arab states.

Jordan, which has never for one day permitted itself to be isolated in an attitude or step relating to the Palestine problem and its future, finds it hard to accept the justifications of which any Arab state can have many when it braves an individual position or an isolated step linked with the Palestine cause and its destiny. If Jordan's attitude towards the Palestine problem is based on a number of basic realities around which all Arab opinion meets and upon which it is agreed, then Jordan thinks that any change in these

/realities



realities or in the present agreement upon them should come as a result of clear, deep, minute, joint discussion at the highest level of responsibility and not as a result of contacts or arrangements made on the side and furtively in the dark.

My conception of the framework for such a discussion is that it should lead to the following of one of two paths:-

- (1) That Jordan should adopt a stand of brotherhood in the full sense of that word, as regards loyalty, sincerity and support, a stand which it is the duty of all to adopt, springing from sacred national pan-Arab considerations. What doubles the need for it is the duty to enable Jordan to bind the wounds of her people and to unite the ranks of this people, and to continue building strength as a guarantee for the continuation and escalation of resistance so that Jordan can carry the burdens imposed upon her by political activity, which proceeds in co-ordination with the UAR to regain the West Bank and liberate the Arab territory usurped in June 1967, and to implement Security Council Resolution 242, and thus to work for the return to the Palestinian people of their rights in accordance with the resolutions of the UN and then enable them to determine their future.
- (2) Setting up a Palestinian entity or a Palestinian Liberation Front. In this case, the interests of the cause itself require that the entity or front be Palestinian in blood, mind and spirit, Palestinian in its institution and membership and not reflecting anything of Arab and world-wide contradictions, or allowing itself to be concealed beneath the Palestinian flag. Otherwise the inevitable result will be total loss and speedy and terrible failure. Despite the fact that boundless dangers obstruct the way of bringing such an idea to fruition, and despite our feeling that even thinking about such an idea involves some sort of abandonment of the people of Palestine and their cause in the face of an occupation imposed upon the whole of Palestine and upon other Arab lands, and despite the difficulties that obstruct the setting up of a body truly representative of the Palestinians so long as thousands of Palestinians live in occupied territory and many others live in the whirlpool of Arab and world-wide contradictions - despite all this, Jordan is prepared to recognise such a body if such is the inclination of the Arab nation on one hand, and if this reflects the view of the sons of the Palestine cause on the other. If the Arabs are convinced of the possibility of the appearance of this body and of its advantages, despite the risks to the cause and despite the fears I have indicated, and if the Arabs accept the responsibility for the appearance of such a body and the consequences thereof, in this event we will stand for ever at the forefront in support of that body so that it can bear the burdens of political and military action on its own.

Since I think that such a discussion should take place at a meeting at the Arab summit level, I re-affirm my

/preparedness



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preparedness to attend this meeting whenever and wherever suitable. The gravity of the present situation and the weight of the responsibility which we all bear towards our people and our cause oblige us to hold this meeting as soon as possible.

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③ NEDiv copy to

9/12 Assessment Staff  
R.D. (M. Wheeler).

GM

Mr. [unclear]  
Miss [unclear]  
Mr. [unclear]



I do not see how this attempt to pierce the Arabs with Hussein's fork can lead to a clean-cut decision: I suspect BRITISH EMBASSY, the existing situation will prove hard to change. AMMAN.

4 December 1970

Assessment staff may have a copy?

Dear Richard,

Are Palestinians Jordanians or Not?

3/4/4/1

In posing this very reasonable question, as reported in our Tel No. 938, King Hussein is doing no more than bring out into the open the two rival Arab policies on the Palestine problem, which can be summarized as the "accept 242" policy and the "leave it to the PLO" policy. But by confronting them with this difference in approach and demanding a Pan Arab ruling on it, King Hussein is going to put the Arab states in general, and the fedayeen in particular, in a most disagreeable dilemma.

2. To date, it is a dilemma which has been avoided simply by ignoring it. Consider for example the following two quotations from Section I of the latest agreement signed in Amman by the King and Yasser Arafat on 13 October: para 1 "Jordan, with its two banks, is in its land and people a single indivisible unit..." and para 4, "the Palestinian people alone, as represented by the Palestinian revolution, have the right to determine their destiny". At my request, Mr. Anthony Nutting quizzed Yasser Arafat on this blatant bit of self-contradiction. The reply was simply a laugh and "this is the reality of the situation"!

3. Nevertheless, King Hussein's forthcoming initiative may oblige the fedayeen to make up their minds whether they really want to continue to operate hazardously and indefinitely on the East Bank, still as notional Jordanian citizens, subject to King Hussein's authority, or whether to assert that they represent a quite separate Arab people, with the implication that they are aliens on Jordanian soil.

4. From the fedayeen point of view, the disadvantages of the latter alternative seem clear enough:-

Would it really? Many fedayeen wd stay there and I can't see support for them drying up.

GM

their

(a) Jordan would be let off the hook and would be free to pursue the interests of Transjordanians, if necessary at the expense of Palestinians now in Jordan. Moreover, the fedayeen would lose the convenient scapegoat of the "reactionary regime" in Jordan to incur the odium of negotiating the recovery of the West Bank.

(b) The Palestinians, or rather their resistance movement, would, if they persisted in rejection of Resolution 242, have to calculate on having to pursue militant aims alone,

R.M. Evans, Esq.,  
Near Eastern Department,  
F.C.O.

/pitting

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pitting some 10,000-20,000 lightly armed troops against the Israeli military machine.

(c) The fedayeen leadership would no longer be free to enjoy that best of all possible worlds: power without responsibility. Whether they liked it or not, they would find themselves saddled with sole responsibility for the future of the Palestinian people, to whom they would become answerable if, through their intransigence, the West Bank remained under occupation or if their extremism led to the persecution of Palestinian minorities by Arab host governments.

(d) As they evolved into a virtual or declared "government in exile", they might lose something of their mystique of the patriotic "self-sacrificers" and with it perhaps some of the popular support they currently enjoy throughout the Arab world.

(e) The most they could realistically hope to achieve unaided would be a negotiated "Palestinian entity" on the West Bank and Gaza. This would be virtually defenceless militarily and of very doubtful economic viability. It would be entirely surrounded by better armed pro-Western neighbours, able at will to overrun it in a matter of hours or to cut its supply lines and communications. (Unless of course it included a corridor in N.W. Jordan giving it access to Syria - our tel 934, para 5 - now a member of the proposed "Federation".) Lastly, and most important, it would imply virtual abandonment of Palestinian territorial claims on Israel proper, the whole original raison d'être of the fedayeen movement.

5. On the other hand, the evolution of the fedayeen leadership into a Palestinian government in exile would not be without its attractions for them. They could expect to get formal recognition from most, if not all, the Arab states and doubtless from many other non Arab governments. It would thus greatly enhance their status internationally and enable them to pursue their claims against Israel more effectively on the political front.

6. Nor, despite all the disadvantages listed above, would they in my opinion lack support for a West Bank state among the silent majority of Palestinians. I have no doubt that the recent civil war here and the prevailing sense of fear amongst the poorer Palestinians has greatly enhanced the attraction for many of them of some small corner where they might feel safer.

7. For the fact is that the fedayeen can no longer regard Jordan as a "safe base" and although a West Bank state might not be very secure, they might see it as being a good deal more so

/than





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than any Lebanese, Syrian or Jordanian alternative. From it, they might hope to subvert countries like Jordan and Kuwait, which would still have large Palestinian minorities. They might hope to join the latest Arab Federation. They might even, in the longer term, hope to dilute the "imperialist elements" of Israel by developing links with the Arab Jewish majority of her population.

8. You will see from Peter Carter's letter to Christopher Long ~~of today's date~~ that Fatah are planning (though not for the first time!) a unification of the entire fedayeen movement which if effected would come very close to a Palestinian government in exile.

9. What this all adds up to is, as is usual I fear in this chaotic part of the world, almost impossible to predict. There does however now seem to be a slight possibility, to put it no higher, that we may see some sort of Palestinian government in exile emerging with the tacit acceptance, despite (or, being Arabs, because of!) vociferous public rejection, of some sort of West Bank state.

10. Clearly, King Hussein suspects that the UAR and her closest allies are plotting a deal with the PLO, whereby the latter would tacitly accept Resolution 242 in return for a Palestinian State federated to the UAR et alia and comprising Gaza, the West Bank and N.W. Jordan. He must undoubtedly regard this as far too high a price to pay for ridding himself of the Palestinians and their aspirations, and even if he were prepared to agree, it seems inconceivable that his army would let him.

11. The dangers of such a development are obvious enough, but I do not personally believe it would necessarily be harmful to Western interests. Palestinian frustration and bitterness has proved such a focus for instability throughout the region that I for one believe that its conversion into orthodox nationalism would be no bad thing.

Yours aye, Ben

(B.L. Strachan)

Copy to:

P.M. Foster, Esq.,  
Tel Aviv.  
E.F. Given, Esq., CMG,  
Beirut.  
D.L.L. Stewart, Esq., CMG,  
Cairo  
Chanceries,  
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SAVING TELEGRAM

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FROM TUNIS

TO F.C.O.

Tel NO. 16 Saving  
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REC IN
REGISTRY No. 35
- 7 DEC 1970
NEM 3/414/1

4 December, 1970.

Addressed to F.C.O. telegram no. 16 Saving of 4 December, repeated to Cairo, Tripoli, Algiers, Rabat, Kuwait, Jedda and Amman.

Wright's letter 2/23 of 26 November to Southorn: Tunisian Palestinian Relations.

MM. Bahi Ladgham and Masmoudi returned to Tunis on 28 and 29 November respectively.

2. In a short statement on arrival, Bahi Ladgham restricted himself to the following points:

- (a) The purpose of his tour of Arab capitals had been to report on the situation in Jordan, and on the views of President Bourguiba.
- (b) In his contacts with King Hussein and the Palestinians, he had discerned a measure of agreement between the two viewpoints, as well as a desire to carry out as soon as possible the terms of the Cairo Agreement and the Amman Protocol.
- (c) Recent incidents in Jordan had been much exaggerated by the press. They were fortuitous happenings, not deliberate acts.
- (d) By dint of frequent meetings with government and resistance leaders, the Observer Mission had overcome all outstanding problems.
- (e) He proposed to return to Amman in mid-December to prepare his report to the signatories of the Cairo Agreement.

3. Masmoudi related on arrival how his mission had grown out of President Bourguiba's reaction to recent events in

/Jordan

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Jordan, and Yasser Arafat's view, expressed during his visit to Tunis, that the situation was serious enough to warrant a further Tunisian initiative. His task had been to represent to the King that everything possible should be done to avoid further bloodshed. Renewed fighting in Jordan would both prevent the unification of the Palestine Resistance, which would profit nobody, and discredit the Arabs in the eyes of world opinion and particularly of the big powers, who would in these circumstances be little inclined to continue their efforts to bring about a Middle East settlement.

4. King Hussein had expressed to Masmoudi his deep concern over recent events, and this had been passed on to the Palestinian leaders who for their part had assured him that they would try to prevent a recurrence. It was now President Bourguiba's wish that the Observer Mission should bring its work to an end as soon as possible.

5. All the Arab heads of state he had met had expressed agreement with Bourguiba's views, including the emphasis he had laid on a continuing process of consultation. The precise nature of Bourguiba's messages is still unknown.

6. It is interesting that Ladgham made no mention of Arafat, nor of the reaction of Arab heads of state to Bourguiba's views. He also played down the events in Jordan which, together with Arafat's interpretation of them, seem to have given the impulse to Masmoudi's mission. It seems that (partly because of personal rivalries) Bourguiba and Masmoudi now want Ladgham and his Mission to disappear from the scene.

MR. MACKENZIE

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TELEGRAM NO 938

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

28 NOVEMBER 1970

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280850Z

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 938 DATED 28 NOVEMBER 1970 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO CAIRO TEL AVIV BAGHDAD BEIRUT WASHINGTON MOSCOW AND PARIS.

MY TELEGRAM NO 934 PARAGRAPH 4: KING HUSSEIN'S CALL FOR AN ARAB SUMMIT.

THE FOREIGN MINISTER HAS, ON THE EVE OF THE FIVE-DAY RAMADAN 'ID HANDED ME (AND SOME AT LEAST OF MY COLLEAGUES) A PHOTOSTAT COPY OF HIS LETTER TO THE HEADS OF ARAB STATES.

2. IT COVERS SEVEN LARGE CLOSELY TYPED PAGES OF RATHER SMUDGED TYPEWRITTEN ARABIC. THE GIST OF IT IS THAT THE TIME HAS COME WHEN A DECISION MUST BE MADE WHETHER THE PALESTINIANS CONTINUE THE STRUGGLE AGAINST ISRAEL AS PART OF A UNITED JORDAN IN THE UNDERSTANDING THAT WHEN "THE DAWN OF LIBERATION IS REACHED" (STRICTLY ON THE LINES OF RESOLUTION 242) THEY WILL BE ACCORDED FULL SELF-DETERMINATION; OR WHETHER A PALESTINIAN ENTITY SEPARATE FROM JORDAN IS SET UP BEFORE LIBERATION IN WHICH EVENT THE ENTITY MUST BE ENTIRELY PALESTINIAN IN COMPOSITION AND PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE FOR ITS OWN STRUGGLE. THE KING FORESEES GREAT DIFFICULTIES AND DANGERS IN THE LATTER COURSE BUT, IF SUCH BE THE WILL OF THE ARABS, JORDAN WILL LOYALLY ACCEPT AND WILL HELP THE ENTITY "TO BEAR ITS POLITICAL AND MILITARY BURDENS". THE LETTER CONCLUDES BY SAYING THAT THE DECISION IS OF SUCH GRAVITY AND URGENCY THAT IT CAN ONLY BE TAKEN BY AN ARAB SUMMIT CONFERENCE WHICH SHOULD BE HELD AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THE KING IS READY TO ATTEND WHEREVER AND WHENEVER CONVENIENT.

3. THE FULL TEXT IN TRANSLATION FOLLOWS BY BAG.

FCO PASS ROUTINE TO WASHINGTON AND PARIS.

MR. PHILLIPS

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TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

21 July, 1970

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Addressed to F.C.O. and repeated for information to:-

Cairo  
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Washington  
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Jordanian Reactions to UAR-Soviet communiqué

The Jordanian Foreign Minister is quoted in the press here as saying that the UAR-Soviet Joint Communiqué was marked by a desire to reach a political settlement through the U.N. in accordance with the UN Charter and the UN Security Council Resolution of 22 November, 1967. "Accordingly it is a sound and wise communiqué marked by a sincere desire to reach a just political settlement and to avoid war." In an interview with the Beirut daily al-Farida, Anton Atullah is quoted as saying that "we seek a settlement for which complete withdrawal and restoration of refugee rights are basic conditions. The Soviet-Egyptian joint communiqué includes these conditions."

2. Editorial comment has welcomed the communiqué as a reply to "manoeuvres and statements" by Washington. The official PLO spokesman, Kamal Nasser, has refused to comment on the communiqué.

Sir P. Adams

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For V.B.  
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PK.

GGGGG



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CYPHER CAT A  
IMMEDIATE AMMAN  
TELEGRAM NO 181

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
27 APRIL 1970.

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ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 181 DATED 27/4/70 REPEATED FOR  
INFORMATION TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK PRIORITY CAIRO WASHINGTON  
AND BEIRUT, ROUTINE TEL AVIV, PARIS AND MOSCOW.

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No 10  
28 APR 1970  
NEM 3/414/1

M.I.P.T. MIDDLE EAST.

AT THE TIME OF MY INTERVIEW WITH THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN  
MINISTER I HAD NOT SEEN AN ACCOUNT OF WHAT HE HAD SAID IN THE  
LEBANESE TELEVISION INTERVIEW WHICH IS NOW REPORTED TO HAVE  
LED THE ISRAELIS TO PROTEST TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL. BUT HE  
DID SPEAK TO ME BITTERLY ABOUT ISRAELI AIR STRIKES AGAINST  
CIVILIAN TARGETS IN JORDAN INCLUDING RAIDS ON THE PAST THREE  
FRIDAYS QUOTE AS IF THEY WANTED BLOOD BEFORE TAKING THE SABBATH  
HOLIDAY UNQUOTE. HE SAID THAT THIS KIND OF ACTION WAS BOUND  
TO DRIVE THE ARABS TOWARDS FURTHER MILITARY OPERATIONS. IN THIS  
CONTEXT HE THEN REPEATED HIS POINT ABOUT ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRIN-  
CIPLE OF WITHDRAWAL REPORTED IN M.I.P.T.

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK PRIORITY WASHINGTON AND ROUTINE  
MOSCOW AND PARIS

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

SIR P ADAMS

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CYPHER CAT A

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(14)

IMMEDIATE AMMAN

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO 180

27 APRIL 1970

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ADDRESSED TO FCO TEL NO 180 DATED 27/4 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, PRIORITY TO CAIRO BEIRUT AND WASHINGTON ROUTINE TO TEL AVIV PARIS AND MOSCOW.

MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT.

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No. 1  
28 APR 1970  
NEM 3/414/1

IN THE COURSE OF A ROUTINE MEETING WITH JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ON 25 APRIL I ASKED ABDUL MUN'IM RIFA'I FOR COMMENTS ON A STATEMENT RELATING TO THE SISCO VISIT IN A RECENT NUMBER OF THE ARAB WORLD (AN ENGLISH LANGUAGE DIGEST OF LOCAL PRESS REPORTS WITH COMMENTARIES, PUBLISHED DAILY IN BEIRUT AND MUCH USED AS A SOURCE BY CORRESPONDENTS IN THIS AREA). THE STATEMENT WAS TO THE EFFECT THAT NO ARAB GOVERNMENT COULD NOW MAKE A SETTLEMENT STICK. I SAID I WAS ASKING THE QUESTION AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THE RECENT GOVERNMENT CHANGES HERE AND OF WHAT LOOKED TO ME, SPEAKING PERSONALLY, LIKE INCREASING SOVIET RIGIDITY IN THE FOUR POWER TALKS.

2. RIFAI SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT CHANGES HAD BEEN DISAPPOINTINGLY SMALL. THERE HAD BEEN TOO MUCH SPECULATION AND PUBLIC DISCUSSION IN RECENT WEEKS AND THIS HAD HAD THE THE EFFECT OF RESTRICTING KING HUSSEIN'S FREEDOM OF ACTION. A MAJOR RESHUFFLE WAS NEEDED AND MIGHT YET COME ABOUT. HOWEVER, CONTACTS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE FEDAYEEN LEADERSHIP, IN ABEYANCE SINCE FEBRUARY, HAD JUST BEEN RESUMED AND RIFAI HIMSELF WAS, AS BEFORE, PLAYING A LEADING ROLE. THE DIFFICULTY WAS THAT AT EACH TIME THE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES WERE ASKED QUOTE HAVE YOU ANY NEWS OF PROGRESS TOWARDS A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT UNQUOTE. THEY HAD TO REPLY QUOTE NO UNQUOTE. THAT MEANT THAT THE CONVERSATION INEVITABLY TURNED TO PREPARATIONS FOR WAR. THIS WAS THE LAST THING THE JORDAN GOVERNMENT WISHED BUT IT WAS FORCED ON THEM BY THE FAILURE OF THE ISRAELIS IN THE TWO AND A HALF YEARS SINCE THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION TO INDICATE THAT THEY ACCEPTED THE PRINCIPLE OF WITHDRAWAL (ON THE CONDITIONS SPECIFIED IN THE RESOLUTION). THAT WAS THE NUB OF THE MATTER. ONCE THE PRINCIPLE WAS CLEARLY ACCEPTED QUOTE WE SHALL REALLY BE IN BUSINESS UNQUOTE.

talk  
~~talk~~

/3.

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3. THE MINISTER WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE HOPED THE AMERICANS RECOGNISED THIS AND THAT REPORTS THEY WOULD BE GETTING FROM SISCO WOULD INDICATE TO THEM THAT THE TIME HAD COME TO LEAN MORE HEAVILY ON THE ISRAELIS. THERE HAD BEEN INDICATIONS FROM ISRAEL (E.G. THE DEMONSTRATION OUTSIDE THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE) THAT THERE WAS A GROWING RECOGNITION EVEN THERE THAT SOME GESTURE TO THE ARABS WAS NEEDED.
4. REVERTING TO MY ORIGINAL QUESTION RIFAI SAID THAT WHAT HE WAS SAYING MEANT THAT THE JORDAN GOVERNMENT DID STILL BELIEVE IN THE POSSIBILITY OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT AND IN THEIR ABILITY TO MAKE IT STICK. BUT HE ADDED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT IF JARRING WAS TO BE RE-LAUNCHED TO ARM HIM WITH SOMETHING CLEAR AND PRECISE TO SAY TO BOTH SIDES. RIFAI FEARED THAT A WOOLLY QUOTE HIGHEST COMMON FACTOR UNQUOTE OF FOUR POWER ATTITUDES WOULD NOT LEAD TO PROGRESS AND HE REMINDED ME OF THE REASONS FOR ARAB DISSATISFACTION WITH THE ROGERS PROPOSALS.
5. TURNING TO THE INTERNAL SITUATION RIFAI DESCRIBED AS VERY SERIOUS INDEED THE CURRENT DEVELOPMENT OF LEFT WING THINKING IN THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT AND EVEN IN FATAH WHICH HAD BEEN SO FAR REGARDED AS MODERATE AND NO PARTICULAR THREAT TO THE REGIME. HE CLAIMED THAT THE MODERATE LEADERSHIP WAS JUST AS ANXIOUS AS THE GOVERNMENT TO SEE THE PATH TOWARDS A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OPENED UP BY AN ISRAELI COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAW AND SAID THAT FOR THEM TOO THE SANDS WERE RUNNING OUT. RIFAI SPOKE AT LENGTH ON THE DANGERS TO THE REGIME OF COMMUNIST PENETRATION (WHICH RECALLED TO ME REPORTS IN UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO. 916 AND CAIRO TELEGRAM 522) BUT HE DEFENDED THE RATHER RIGID POSTURE OF SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES IN THE FOUR POWER TALKS ON THE GROUNDS THAT THIS MIGHT BE THE WAY TO PERSUADE THE AMERICANS THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO GET THE ISRAELIS TO CONCEDE THE POINT ON WITHDRAWAL IF THERE WAS TO BE ANY PROSPECT OF PEACE IN OUR GENERATION.
6. SEE M.I.F.T.
- FCO PASS IMMEDIATE TO UKMIS NEW YORK, PRIORITY WASHINGTON, ROUTINE PARIS AND MOSCOW.

SIR P ADAMS

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ROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK  
TELEGRAM NO. 963  
UNCLASSIFIED

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
28 APRIL 1970

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 963  
OF 28 APRIL REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON AMMAN BEIRUT  
CAIRO TEL AVIV.

RECEIVED IN AMMAN BEIRUT REGISTRY No. 10 29 APR 1970 NEM3/44/1
--

MY TEL. NO. 954: MIDDLE EAST: SECURITY COUNCIL

EL FARRA (JORDAN) WROTE TWO LETTERS TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 27 APRIL (S/9764 AND S/9765) COMPLAINING OF ISRAELI ATTACKS ON JORDAN. ACCORDING TO THE FIRST LETTER, THERE WERE OVER 85 ATTACKS DURING THE PERIOD 1 JANUARY - 10 APRIL. THE LETTER CONCLUDES QUOTE THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AND PARTICULARLY THE PERMANENT MEMBERS PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY, ARE DUTY-BOUND TO ACT IN ORDER TO SAVE BOTH THE LIVES OF THE INNOCENT AND THE PRESTIGE OF THE UNITED NATIONS AUTHORITY. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY CANNOT AFFORD TO REMAIN SILENT, AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD NOT CONTINUE TO SHELVE SUCH COMPLAINTS WITHOUT TAKING EFFECTIVE AND PROTECTIVE MEASURES UNQUOTE.

2. THE SECOND LETTER COMPLAINS OF ATTACKS BY ISRAELI JETS ON 24 APRIL IN THE AREAS OF MUTHALATH ES-SALT AND DEIR ALLA.

3. TEOKOAH (ISRAEL) HAS REPLIED (S/9767) TO THESE LETTERS, STATING THAT IN VIEW OF THE CONTINUING ACTS OF AGGRESSION ON ISRAEL PERPETRATED FROM JORDANIAN TERRITORY, ISRAEL IS COMPELLED TO ACT IN SELF-DEFENCE.

/N.P. 4

*mls*



-2-

4. TEKOAH HAS ALSO WRITTEN (S/9766) DRAWING ATTENTION TO THE STATEMENT ON 24 APRIL BY ABDUL MONEIM RIFAI THAT QUOTE HE AGREES WITH NASSER THAT THE CEASEFIRE BETWEEN THE ARABS AND ISRAEL IS NON-EXISTENT UNQUOTE. TEKOAH ASKS THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO QUOTE URGENTLY APPRISE THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT OF THE FULL IMPLICATIONS THAT WOULD ENSUE FROM SUCH A DECLARATION REPUDIATING THE CEASE-FIRE UNQUOTE.

FCO PASS AMMAN BEIRUT CAIRO TEL AVIV.

LORD CARADON

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED].

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


(i) Mr Evans

(ii) Enter

20/4

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BRITISH EMBASSY,

AMMAN.

17 April, 1970

Dear Christopher,

Speech by King Hussein on 16 April, 1970

King Hussein made a speech on 16 April on the occasion of the handing over of the colours to the Royal Jordanian Artillery Force. He said, "We have followed every possible course to establish peace in the Land of Peace - we have welcomed every honest endeavour to prevent a murderous war in the area that might spread to include the whole world. But our hopes of reaching a solution that would restore our nation's lost dignity and end the plight and reduce the sufferings of our brethren in the occupied territory were destroyed as a result of Zionist fanaticism... We shall fight to liberate our land. We shall follow every pathway that will lead us to our rights, no matter what the difficulties."

2. The King went on to say that all Arab states and peoples must participate in the fight against the enemy. Support should be given to Jordan, which was playing a unique role in the liberation battle. He said that he supported the Palestinian resistance, which he described as legitimate and a sacred duty.

3. This speech was delivered the day following the anti-American disturbances which included an attack on the American Embassy here and the burning of the American Centre, and the day before Sisco was due to arrive in Amman. (The cancellation of his visit had not at that time been announced.) Seen in this light his remarks on peace were strikingly pessimistic, and those on the fedayeen - some of whose elements at least were working actively to sabotage the Sisco visit - unexpectedly warm.

force majeure?

Yours ever,

R.E.

20/4

C. P. Carter

(C. P. Carter)

C. W. Long, Esq.,  
N.E.D.,  
F.C.O.

c.c. Chanceries: Beirut  
Cairo  
Tel Aviv  
Washington  
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CYPHER/CAT A

U.K.MIS NEW YORK TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELNO. 954 25 APRIL 1970

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RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 27 APR 1970 NEM 3/44/1
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ADDRESSED TO FCO TELNO 954 OF 25 APRIL REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO AMMAN, CAIRO, BEIRUT, WASHINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW, TEL AVIV AND SAVING TO KUWAIT.

MY TELNO 712: MIDDLE EAST: SECURITY COUNCIL.

JAKOBSON (FINLAND), WHO IS THIS MONTH'S PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, TOLD WARNER YESTERDAY THAT EL-FARRA (JORDAN) HAD BEEN TO SEE HIM AND HAD PRODUCED A LOT OF STATISTICS ABOUT RECENT ISRAELI ATTACKS ON JORDAN. HE HAD NOT ASKED FOR A MEETING OF THE COUNCIL BUT HAD SAID THAT HE DID NOT SEE HOW THAT BODY COULD SIT IDLY BY IN FACE OF THESE PROVOCATIONS. HE ASKED JAKOBSON TO PUT THE MATTER TO ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL AND REQUEST THEM TO CONSIDER WHETHER THERE WAS ANYTHING THEY COULD DO. JAKOBSON ADDED THAT HE DID NOT THINK EL-FARRA HAD ANY SUPPORT FROM THE OTHER ARABS AND THAT THIS WAS PURELY A PERSONAL INITIATIVE. HE OBVIOUSLY DID NOT EXPECT ANYONE TO HAVE ANY REAL SUGGESTIONS TO MAKE.

2. I SHALL NOT BE ALTOGETHER SURPRISED IF WE ARE FACED WITH A CALL FOR THE COUNCIL TO MEET. AS YOU KNOW, I HAVE ALWAYS COUNSELLED CAUTION WHEN EL-FARRA HAS SPOKEN TO ME ABOUT THIS IN THE PAST AND I SHALL CONTINUE TO DO SO.

FCO PASS AMMAN, CAIRO, BEIRUT, PARIS, MOSCOW, TEL AVIV AND SAVING TO KUWAIT.

LORD CARADON

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To negotiate with the representatives of another state/ (10)

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movement does not necessarily imply the recognition of any right claimed by our movement.

BRITISH EMBASSY, AMMAN.

Miss Spickett 1615/A  
M. Makris

2 April, 1970

This is (basically) the difference between the principle of withdrawal and "boundaries".

CS Makris 10/11

I fear this is all rather muddled.

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No. 10

23 APR 1970  
Dear Peter,

NEM3/44/1

Arabs/Israel - Direct Negotiations

What about the negotiations in London between the Americans and the Chinese?

4/2

Enter

R.G.

21/4.

I wonder if I might venture a few observations on the Jordanian attitude to Direct Negotiations. I am sure they will be well known to you, but can perhaps bear recapitulation, if only because the various comments within and outside the Four Power talks seem, no doubt misleadingly, to be overlooking them.

2. I suspect the trouble lies in the framing of Resolution 242, which balances "withdrawal" against "peace", whereas in the Jordanian book "withdrawal" should be balanced against "recognition".

3. Indeed the Israelis have repeatedly stated that their insistence on direct negotiations is based on their belief that this symbolic act of recognition is an essential pre-requisite to any settlement. Here the Arabs entirely agree with them: to persuade their people to recognise the right of Israel to exist will involve them in considerable internal political difficulties. Moreover the importance attached to it by the Israelis themselves has convinced Jordanian leaders that the recognition card is the strongest they have, since, by their reasoning, permanent peace, navigation rights and an end to the boycott will all flow inescapably from it.

4. By this reasoning, therefore, once the Arabs have sat down at the conference table with the Israelis they will be irrevocably committed to recognition, but in so doing they will have played their most important card.

5. It follows that they see in Israeli insistence on - and in Western urgings to - the conference table, an attempt to surrender their precious recognition card, without any assurance that the Israelis will surrender their most important card: withdrawal from all the territories (including East Jerusalem).

6. Thus when Israeli advocates point out that Resolution 242 requires of them an irreversible and concrete withdrawal, whereas the Arabs merely have to promise to make peace for the future, Arab advocates stand this on its head and say that Direct Negotiations require of them a concrete act of recognition of Israel, whereas the Israelis merely have to promise to withdraw to whatever boundary may be decided to be "secure".

7. From the Jordanian point of view, therefore, no formulation would be acceptable which did not prescribe a public Israeli commitment to total withdrawal - though not necessarily the withdrawal itself - as an absolute precondition to any direct negotiation. This is why they cannot accept the Rogers proposals as they stand, prescribing as they do

/that

J. P. Tripp, Esq.,  
Near Eastern Dept.,  
F.C.O.

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that the Arabs surrender their recognition card by direct negotiations, in return for at best only part of the withdrawal card (i.e. excluding Jerusalem and Gaza), and at worst a pious Four Power Resolution without any Israeli commitment.

8. I know this all sounds terribly legalistic, but that, as you know better than I, is the way our Arab friends are. I am sure our formulations will get nowhere with them unless this is taken into account.

*Yours aye,  
Ben*

(B. L. STRACHAN)

c.c. Mr. A. D. Parsons, C.M.G., M.V.O.,  
UKMIS, New York.

P. M. Foster, Esq.,  
Tel Aviv.

D. L. L. Stewart, Esq., C.M.G.,  
Cairo.

Chanceries at: Washington  
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CYPHER CAT/A

PRIORITY AMMAN

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO. 147

4 APRIL 1970.

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ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 147 DATED 4/4 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION  
TO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, ROUTINE WASHINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW,  
TEL AVIV, CAIRO, BEIRUT, SAVING TO KUWAIT UKDEL NATO AND ANKARA.

UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO 710  
MIDDLE EAST IN THE UNITED NATIONS.

THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER TELLS ME THAT THE ARAB AMBASSADORS  
AT THE UNITED NATIONS HELD A MEETING TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION  
CREATED BY THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE  
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND THAT FARRA SUBSEQUENTLY RECOMMENDED THAT  
HE BE AUTHORISED TO ASK FOR A MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.  
ABDUL MUN'IM RIFAI SAID THAT HE HAD NOT YET ANSWERED FARRA'S  
TELEGRAM AND THAT HE DID NOT INTEND TO DO SO FOR THE TIME BEING.  
HE SAW SOME HOPE OF INCREASED ACTIVITY ON THE PART OF THE FOUR  
AND AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE UNWISE NOW TO PUT THIS AT RISK BY  
STAGING A FIERCE DEBATE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. BUT IF THE  
ISRAELIS MADE ANY DRAMATIC MOVE IN RELATION TO SETTLEMENTS  
HE WOULD HAVE TO THINK AGAIN.

2.. AS FOR THE REDUCTION OF REFUGEE RELIEF, THE MINISTER SAID  
THAT THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN INFORMED BY THE COMMISSIONER--  
GENERAL OF UNRWA THAT THE SOAP RATION HAD ALREADY BEEN CUT BUT  
THAT WITH LUCK NO FURTHER REDUCTION IN RATIONS (AS DISTINCT FROM  
SERVICES) WOULD BECOME NECESSARY UNTIL THE END OF THE YEAR.  
MEANWHILE U THANT HAD ASKED THE ARABS TO GIVE HIM A LITTLE LONGER  
TO SEE WHETHER HE COULD RAISE ADDITIONAL FUNDS FOR UNRWA.  
IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES JORDAN DID NOT PROPOSE TO CALL FOR A SPECIAL  
SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT THIS TIME. BUT SHE WOULD DO  
SO IMMEDIATELY UNRWA ANNOUNCED ANY CUT IN RATIONS WHICH WERE  
ALREADY AT THE BARE SUBSISTENCE LEVEL.

FCO PASS PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, ROUTINE WASHINGTON, PARIS,  
AND SAVING TO KUWAIT, UKDEL NATO AND ANKARA.

SIR P ADAMS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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CYPHER/CAT A

PRIORITY UK MISSION NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NO. 710

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TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

30 MARCH 1970

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY NO. 10 NEM3/844/1
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ADDRESSED TO FCO TELNO. 710 OF 30 MARCH REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON PARIS MOSCOW TEL AVIV CAIRO AMMAN BEIRUT AND SAVING TO KUWAIT UKDEL NATO AND ANKARA.

MIDDLE EAST

EL-FARRA (JORDAN) CAME TO SEE ME TO-DAY TO HAVE A GENERAL TALK. WE HAD LITTLE NEW TO SAY TO ONE ANOTHER BUT IT MAY BE WORTHWHILE TO MAKE THIS SUMMARY.

2. APART FROM THE DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION (WITH EXTREMISTS ON THE ISRAELI SIDE APPARENTLY TAKING OVER IN PRESSURE TO ANNEX ARAB TERRITORIES AND THE FEDAYEEN CREATING INCREASINGLY SERIOUS PROBLEMS FOR THE ARAB GOVERNMENTS) EL-FARRA HAD TWO IMMEDIATE CONCERNS. FIRST THE PERMANENT SETTLEMENTS NOW BEING ESTABLISHED BY THE ISRAELIS AROUND JERUSALEM AND ELSEWHERE IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND SECOND THE PLIGHT OF THE REFUGEES WITH REDUCED RELIEF. ON THE LATTER HE SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WAS STILL PROPOSING A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. BUT I DID NOT GET THE IMPRESSION THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD MADE A FINAL DECISION ON THIS.

3. IT WAS THE ACTIONS OF THE ISRAELIS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES THAT WORRIED THE ARABS MOST. EL-FARRA SAID THAT HE WAS IN CONSULTATION WITH HIS GOVERNMENT ABOUT CALLING A MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THERE WERE STRONG ARGUMENTS FOR DOING SO. HE WONDERED IF THE FOUR WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THIS ISSUE AT TOMORROW'S MEETING AND RAISE THE MATTER IN THE COUNCIL AS PERMANENT MEMBERS. I SAID THAT I DID NOT IMAGINE THAT THE FOUR WOULD AGREE TO DO SO: AND I REPEATED WHAT I HAD OFTEN SAID TO HIM BEFORE THAT IT IS UNWISE TO GO TO THE COUNCIL WITHOUT KNOWING EXACTLY WHAT ONE WANTS AND BEING SURE ONE CAN GET IT. HE SAID THAT IF HE DID GO TO THE COUNCIL NOW IT WOULD BE TO GET A LIMITED /RESOLUTION

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RESOLUTION ON THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES IN SOMETHING LIKE THE WORDING OF THE RESOLUTIONS ALREADY OBTAINED ON JERUSALEM. ON THAT HE THOUGHT HE SHOULD BE ABLE TO GET A UNANIMOUS RESOLUTION.

4. WHEN WE DISCUSSED THE PROGRESS OF THE TALKS BETWEEN THE FOUR I SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME VERY LIMITED PROGRESS IN RECENT WEEKS. FIRST WHEN THE SOVIET UNION RESPONDED TO THE APPEAL TO COMMENT ON COMMITMENTS TO PEACE AND SECOND WHEN THE AMERICANS HAD AGREED TO THE DRAFTING OF A PROGRESS REPORT. ROGERS WAS PAINFULLY SLOW, BUT IT WAS NOW POSSIBLE TO HOPE THAT THE DEPUTIES WOULD BE PUT TO WORK AND COULD REPORT ON AREAS OF COMMON AGREEMENT WITHIN A FEW WEEKS. THAT COULD ENABLE JARRING TO GET GOING AGAIN. WE HAD TO THINK BEYOND THAT AND I HAD MYSELF HAD IN MIND THAT JARRING'S NEXT ROUND MIGHT LEAD TO THE SUMMONING OF BOTH SIDES BY THE FOUR OR BY THE COUNCIL. ALTHOUGH I WELL UNDERSTOOD THE SERIOUS CONCERN ABOUT THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES I MYSELF THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD BE BEST TO LEAVE THE CALLING OF THE COUNCIL TILL THIS LATER STAGE TO ALLOW THE PRESENT TALKS BETWEEN THE FOUR TO PROCEED WITHOUT THE INTERRUPTION OF A FIERCE DEBATE IN THE COUNCIL.

5. ALTHOUGH EL-FARRA GAVE NO POSITIVE INDICATION OF HIS GOVERNMENT'S INTENTIONS I THINK THAT HE WAS HIMSELF INCLINED TO AGREE WITH WHAT I SAID.

FCO PLEASE PASS PARIS MOSCOW TEL AVIV CAIRO AMMAN BEIRUT SAVING TO KUWAIT UKDELNATO AND ANKARA

LORD CARADON

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- 5 MAR 1970

NEM 3/44/1

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B18 HUSSEIN WARNS: SITUATION RAPIDLY DETERIORATING  
(AMMAN RADIO) HUSSEIN HAS SAID THAT THE USA HAS NOT DONE  
ANYTHING FOR MIDDLE EAST PEACE SINCE THE JUNE 1967 WAR. HE SAID  
THAT THE SITUATION IN THE AREA IS GREATLY DETERIORATING AND THAT  
THE POSSIBILITIES OF PEACE ARE ALMOST NON-EXISTENT.

THE KING, WHO WAS GIVING A SPECIAL INTERVIEW TO THE ASSOCIATED  
PRESS MIDDLE EAST CORRESPONDENT WARNED THAT THE MIDDLE EAST IS  
RAPIDLY SLIPPING TOWARDS A SITUATION WHERE ISRAEL MAY STAGE  
ANOTHER AGGRESSION AND DEAL A LARGESCALE BLOW TO THE ARAB STATES

MF BBC MON 3/3 EM 1451

OIN N

B18 HUSSEIN 2: USA DOING NOTHING FOR PEACE

THE KING ADDED THAT THE USA COULD PLAY A POSITIVE ROLE TO  
STOP THE DETERIORATION, BUT NOTHING IT HAS DONE SO FAR HAS BEEN IN  
THE INTERESTS OF PEACE BECAUSE IT SUPPORTS ISRAEL AND CONTINUES  
TO SUPPLY IT WITH WEAPONS.

THE USA IS ENCOURAGING A SITUATION WHICH MAY CAUSE GREAT  
HARM TO WORLD PEACE AND ITS POLICY IS FAR FROM THE NEUTRALITY WE  
DESIRE, THE KING SAID.

MF BBC MON 3/3 EM 1452

B18 HUSSEIN 3: ROGERS' PROPOSALS AMBIGUOUS

THE KING DESCRIBED THE PROPOSALS OF U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE  
WILLIAM ROGERS TO SETTLE THE CRISIS AS EXTREMELY AMBIGUOUS AND  
DECLARED THAT THE U.N. RESOLUTION OF 22ND NOVEMBER 1967 IS THE  
MOST THAT JORDAN CAN ACCEPT TO ESTABLISH PEACE.

HE ALSO SAID THAT JORDAN WILL NOT HESITATE TO PROCURE ARMS  
FROM ANY SOURCE, SHOULD OBSTACLES ARISE IN OBTAINING THEM FROM  
TRADITIONAL SOURCES.

END BBC MON (KY) 3/3 EM 1453



CONFIDENTIAL  
SAVING TELEGRAM

BY BAG

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO AMMAN

TEL. NO. 1 SAVING

23 FEBRUARY 1970 (NED)

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6

TOP COPY

*pr*  
*12/3*

Addressed to Amman Tel. No. 1 Saving of 23 February, repeated for information Saving to Cairo, Tel Aviv.

Call by the Jordanian Ambassador.

The Jordanian Ambassador called on Mr. Luard on the afternoon of 20 February to receive our reply to the Aide Memoire left with me by the Arab Ambassadors on 11 February.

2. Mr. Luard went over the usual points about our position over the ceasefire and over our arms policy generally. He assured Mr. Juma that as far as Chieftains to Israel were concerned no new deal had been entered into; and as for the supply of arms to Libya, no decisions had yet been taken. Provided there were adequate safeguards for its implementation, we would be in favour of an international arms limitation agreement to lower the temperature in the area.

3. Mr. Juma remarked that he thought President Nasser's recent interview in Le Monde contained a number of constructive points. In answer to a question, he agreed that the Arabs would eventually have to negotiate with the Israelis; but it was impossible to do so whilst the Israelis were in occupation of Arab territory. Mr. Juma seemed anxious to dissociate himself from the UAR Ambassador's recent call on the Prime Minister and his action in speaking so freely to the press afterwards.

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covering CONFIDENTIAL.

NEM 3/44/1  
✓

Mr. Ferguson.

Mr. Luard's meeting with the Jordanian  
Ambassador, on 20 Feb.

We spoke.

2. As agreed, I attach a short, draft first-person minute about this meeting. (If Mr. Luard would prefer a longer account of the meeting, I can of course provide it.)

*A.C.D.S. MacRae*

(A.C.D.S. MacRae.)

Near Eastern Department.

20 February 1970.

Mr Luard.

(Draft now adapted to take form of tel to Amman)

(done.)

Re: Amman

1.5.70 24/2


*W. Ferguson*

23/2 1.23/2



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5



Mr. Miers

...

I attach Talking Points for Mr. Luard's meeting with the Jordanian Ambassador at 3 p.m. this afternoon.

2. Mr. Luard should know that the Saudi Ambassador told Mr. Acland at dinner the other night that he wished to make it quite clear that he did not wish to associate himself with the démarche and the Aide Memoire presented. He was asked to be the spokesman for the call on the Secretary of State but declined. He merely went along with the others in order that Saudi Arabia should not be singled out for attack by the other Arab states.

3. The Jordanian Ambassador, whom I met at dinner after the call on the Secretary of State, adopted a very reasonable line and was evidently not disposed to press the case as firmly as e.g. the Iraqi Ambassador. Mr. Sa'ad Juma in fact deprecated the line taken by Mr. Khalaf.

*J.P. Tripp*

(J.P. Tripp)  
20 February, 1970.

Flag A : text of aide memoire.

*Sc*

*In MacRae  
Rg.*

*- Enter a PA.*

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*from  
23/2.*



Meeting between Mr. Luard and the  
Jordanian Ambassador on 20 February

Talking Points

We have read with care the cogently argued Aide Memoire you and your colleagues left with the Secretary of State on 11 February.

2. The most important propositions advanced in it are two:
  - (a) that we should stop supplying any arms to Israel (though not, by implication, to the Arab states); and
  - (b) that an international arms embargo on the sale of arms to the Middle East is unacceptable because "it can only mean the sanction of the status quo" to Israel's advantage.
3. As the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary reminded you and your colleagues last week, it is not our policy to comment on reports or rumours of specific arms transactions. I can therefore reply on these points only in general terms.
4. On the first, we always take into account (as we have said publicly many times) the effect of any hypothetical arms sale on the international efforts which are being made to secure a just and lasting peace. But to cancel existing contracts, and stop supplying spare parts to Israel would only increase her sense of isolation. This is already a dangerous obstacle to a settlement, which has, frankly, been increased by Arab threats of renewed war. If we were to take such action, the sole result would be increased

/Israeli



Israeli insecurity leading to a further determination to dig in on their present, militarily advantageous positions.

5. Our second major objection is that, given our strong commitment to impartiality as between the two sides in the Arab/Israel dispute, it would not be politically feasible to stop supplies to one side without stopping them to another. Would your country, for example, really be prepared to forego the tanks and other armaments with which we are supplying you?

6. This leads me on to the question of a general agreement on arms limitation to the Middle East. Your Aide Memoire suggests that such a move would merely influence the situation in Israel's favour. I simply cannot accept this. In the present tense situation, the acquisition of more powerful weapons of all sorts by both sides can only increase the chances of war. We think - and evidently many other countries agree with us - that an international agreement on arms limitation would have the effect of lowering the temperature. We are prepared to work for this, even before a settlement if necessary, provided that the other major arms suppliers agree.

7. Finally, I should add that this whole question must be seen in the context of the need to bring about a political settlement which will make possible a just and lasting peace. As you will know, this is our main objective in the Middle East; and in coming to decisions on the supply of arms to any country in the area, we keep this firmly in mind.



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Mr. Arthur

Mr. Miers

Reply to the Aide Memoire left by the Arab Ambassadors  
on 11 February

After discussion with the Private Secretary, I recommend that rather than send a written reply to the Aide Memoire left by the Arab Ambassadors with the Secretary of State on 11 February, we should give an oral reply.

2. This might most appropriately be done by summoning the Jordanian Ambassador (who was spokesman for the rest on 11 February) to see Mr. Luard, at the end of this week. If this recommendation is accepted, Near Eastern Department will draft talking points.

3. North African Department and Arabian Department concur.

*J.P. Tripp*

(J.P. Tripp)  
17 February, 1970.

c.c. Mr. Miers  
Mr. Walker, NAD  
Mr. Acland, Arabian Dept.

*J.P. Tripp 5/17/2*

Mr. Evans.

We spoke. The Jordanian Ambassador will call on Mr. Luard at 3.58 pm. on Friday, 20 February. You kindly agreed to arrange for speaking notes to be prepared and for a member of the dept to be CONFIDENTIAL present to take the record.

*K. Ferguson*  
19/2

*Mr. MacRae*  
*to spoke*  
*R.E. 19/2*



Th. Rackae


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(J.P. Tripp)  
17 February, 1970.

c.c. Mr. Miers  
Mr. Walker, NAD  
Mr. Acland, Arabian Dept.



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NEM 3/4/41

1. ~~Mr. Brown~~ (8M) R.E. 18/2  
2. ~~Mr. Baker~~ (2) 2/iii  
3. ~~Mr. MacRae~~ (1) L.E. 2/2.3  
(Action taken.) ~~Mr. MacRae~~ 18/2 Mr. Long to see also  
Mr. Tripp 172

The Jordanian Ambassador called to see me today.

Pr  
am  
3/3

2. On Jordan's internal situation, the Ambassador expressed a somewhat surprising confidence in the strength of the position of the King. He said, and repeated several times, that the King could have overcome the guerrilla movements with ease in the last few days, but had not wished to incur the cost in lives and disturbance that would have been involved. He could still do so now "within 24 hours". He was sure that in the forthcoming discussions with the guerrillas, the King would be able to reach an agreement which would control their activities, which had become increasingly lawless of late. There had been a number of incidents which had aroused the concern of the civilian population, and probably a new agreement would prevent the carrying of arms by the Fedayeen in the towns.

3. But the Ambassador went on to express his concern at the increasing power of communists and other elements within these groups. He said that, while El Fatah was reasonable and moderate, other groups of extremists were rapidly increasing in influence. So long as there was no settlement and no Israeli withdrawal, and especially so long as the Americans seemed to be supporting Israel, this situation was likely to continue and perhaps grow worse.

4. The Ambassador said that at the meetings between King Hussein and President Nasser in Cairo, he thought there had been general agreement on the need for a political solution. I asked which were the points on which the two leaders

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were questioning the American proposals, and he said that he thought these were Jerusalem, the Golan Heights and whether the de-militarised zones would be on both sides of the border.

5. On the position of Syria, the Ambassador said that he thought that Syria was now preparing to accept the Security Council Resolution, though they might not say so publicly. The fact that they had attended the meeting of front line states probably indicated this. Syria too was concerned about the increasing scale of violence and the development of the power of the Fedayeen.

6. The Ambassador several times expressed his concern at the growth of Soviet influence in the area, which was bound to continue so long as the present situation remained. He expressed satisfaction at British policy and attitudes, though he hoped that we would begin to bring more pressure to bear against the United States. But he was extremely disturbed about the whole American approach to the problem. He thought Mr. Rogers' speech had been an advance, but since then it had seemed to be repudiated and it was difficult to understand where United States policy was leading.

*h.*

(D.E.T. Luard)  
17 February, 1970

Copy:

Mr. Hayman  
Mr. Arthur  
N.A.D.

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attrition with great fanfare against Israel, announcing the entry of the war into what he described as the offensive phase. Litvinov, the renowned Soviet diplomat, once declared that peace is indivisible. So, too, is war. Once Nasir declared war he must bear all the consequences of such a war to his people, including such unfortunate events as the bombing of a civilian factory as a result of an error.

The error itself is understandable if one takes into account the high speed at which modern planes fly when bombing and their low height, and the fact that the military camp which was the target and the factory were near each other in terms of flying distance and had similar visual characteristics. This is an inherent risk one takes in modern air warfare and we can point to no better example of such a danger than the war in Vietnam, where frequently one learns of errors on the part of the US Air Force, and, as the Americans like to explain there that the fault lies with those who provoke and encourage the war, so in this case, which brings one to ponder on the flexibility of US responses when the events are in the Middle East.

Israel has no interest in attacking the civilian population in Egypt because, in my view, it would achieve results diametrically opposed to those she wishes to achieve. The present policy is to bring down Israel's casualties along the Canal and this policy is already partially successful, and to show up Nasir's inept leadership before his own people in the hope that he will decide in favour of a cease-fire and, who knows, a political solution. The policy is not to create what Nasir solely requires - a rallying point for national solidarity - and that is what civilian bombing would bring about. As honest civilians in Cairo stand on the rooftops and watch the bombing knowing full well that they will not be hit, the psychological effect on Nasir's standing in stature is a very serious one.

I would not estimate an escalation from these events because the Egyptian Air Force would not attempt any major operation against Israel. It is not very successful in the defence of Egypt and its prospects in attack are slim. They could send the odd plane to infiltrate the radar defences, but I doubt that they would make any such attempt against the civilian population for fear of an Israel reply in kind. They must by now have been convinced by the Minister of Defence's gesture that this was a case of genuine error.

Meanwhile, the indications are that the Israel policy of pressure is beginning to bear fruit, at all events to have an effect. Nasir may have come to accept Husayn's view in favour of a political solution. The major obstacle in this direction is that created by the Al-Fatah and other terrorist groups. I doubt if Husayn's recent actions against these groups were taken without prior clearance with Nasir and with his approval. Who knows but that we may be seeing a major development in the area. If so it is thanks to Israel's pressure.

#### Abba Eban on his European Tour

Israel home service in Hebrew 11.00 GMT 15.2.70

#### Text of report:

The Foreign Minister, Abba Eban, said today before his departure for Holland on a tour of four Western countries that the time had come to brief the European leaders on what was taking place in the Middle East. He said that they should know that Israel's policy was based on four principles - cease-fire, negotiations, agreements and peace. He added that Israel was not isolated in the Western world. Eban said that the USA was also interested that Israel should demonstrate the diversity of its relations with countries in Western Europe.

Asked about Israeli-German relations in the light of Bonn's attempts to strengthen its links with the Arab States, Eban said that he shares the opinion of the former Israeli Ambassador to Germany that Bonn's policy towards Israel was stable.



~~Asked why his tour programme bypassed France, Eban replied: France is bypassing me. He added that he was not visiting France because neither the situation nor the atmosphere in France today was suitable for such a visit.~~

~~Regarding Jarring's mission, Eban said that Israel had never decided that there was a need to put an end to this mission; the opposite was true. The mission had been suspended on the initiative of the four Powers.~~

#### King Husayn's Press Conference of 14th February

Amman home service in Arabic 12.25 and 16.54 GMT 14.2.70

12.25 GMT: Excerpts from King Husayn's replies to questions at his press conference (see also ME/3306/A/7) (broadcast from a recording):

Q. Your Majesty, is there any explanation or special reason for choosing this particular time to issue the measures?

A. This time was as good as any. There was nothing significant about the timing... There were some negative points we should have taken up and should still take up to prevent any harm to the people's cohesion and effort in the battle. These negative points harm mainly the fida'iyin. In fact the measures were not aimed at fida'i action at all. They were only intended as a reminder of existing laws and regulations. They contained nothing new and sought to impose no restrictions.

It has been said that there are various interpretations of the measures. Perhaps it is better if I answer these interpretations. One interpretation, for instance, said the timing of the measures was connected with the front line state's conference. This country is at the heart of the front line, but these purely internal measures had nothing at all to do with the front line States' conference. If there is any connection at all it lies in one point only: we feel more than ever that we are in a battle and that an all-out battle may be forced on us at any moment. We must therefore prepare and organise ourselves as much as we can to play our full part in this battle... We have a strong feeling that we are on the threshold of battle. Because of this battle and its consequences, we want to organise ourselves and our resources, and we still do.

Another interpretation is that one of the aims of the measures was to remove weapons from citizens. Naturally the State has its own priorities and a limited capacity. The State relies first on its armed forces. At the same time the State plays another basic role with all resources at its disposal: the arming, training and organising of citizens to play their part in the all-out battle which may be forced on us at any time. Thus the aim was not to remove weapons but actually to arm the people. In fact the aim was to ensure the proper use of these weapons so that by organisation and order they would be a deterrent to our enemies and so that, if a battle is forced on us, our people will be able to play their part properly.

For example, a survey has shown that as a result of road accidents and, perhaps the misuse of weapons in public and populated places, we lost a large number of innocent men, women and children last year. We have discovered that the rate was extremely high. This was one of the factors that necessitated organisation and co-ordination to prevent such incidents to some extent. This State arms the people. The Arab nation helps us in this. However, when we carry weapons we should do so properly and should use them in the right place. We should all co-operate to prevent, as much as we can, regrettable incidents and to avoid losses.

Naturally the battle begins on the front line, the battlefield and the occupied territory, where we should fight our enemy and resist his occupation. Should an all-out war take place or should the aggression spread, then everyone would have to fight the battle everywhere. There are no other interpretations...



Q. Your Majesty, Jordan welcomes a just, peaceful solution. What are the present chances of a peaceful solution and what is Jordan's attitude to the New York Big Four talks?

A. Frankly I believe the chances of a peaceful, just and honourable solution are gradually diminishing. This is due to our enemy and to the support and the money and arms the enemy is receiving to continue his defiance of the world's will and to continue his aggression. I have said more than once that there is no peaceful or non-peaceful solution. We accept only one solution - a solution which returns to us all our usurped land and our Jerusalem, and will enable us to save all our kinsmen, brothers and sons in the occupied territory.

This country is working in full co-ordination with the front line States, and particularly with the fraternal UAR - our comrade and partner on the long road to our aims and the aims of all Arabs. In view of this we should concentrate on ourselves first to meet the challenge. With everyone's solidarity, everyone's determination and full mobilisation of all our resources, our chances increase of achieving our aims and recovering every inch of our land, Jerusalem, and our people.

Q. Has the issue of these measures [words indistinct] specific measures by the authorities at that time?

A. As we said before, the measures were not expected to meet such misunderstanding and uproar... The implementation of some of the measures had actually begun. When we found that the measures caused an uproar and a misunderstanding we froze them. Our aim has been and still is to restore normality. We have met a full response from everyone concerned on the need to organise things and to co-operate with us in achieving our common aim. This is exactly what has happened.

Q. What is Your Majesty's attitude to the fida'i organisations since the crisis and your meeting with them?

A. In no way can we be opposed to any organisation which has arisen with our approval, which exists because we wanted it and enabled it to exist, and which wants to play its part in this battle, to resist occupation and the invaders.

I have indeed found a good spirit and understanding of this fact and these responsibilities from everyone, as I have said. Consequently the measures were frozen and conditions began to return to normal. Everyone insists on the need to continue our meetings to block every gap which could lead to a recurrence of such regrettable incidents or which could be exploited by any quarter.

Q. [Words indistinct] can Your Majesty give us a picture of what happened?

A. In brief, the Government issued its measures and the departments began to implement some of them. The fida'i organisations were contacted and the situation was explained to them. It was agreed to freeze the measures and to prevent anything which could bring losses until a complete study had been made of the matter and a complete plan drawn up to protect everyone and ensure the rights of this country and of everyone and increase our strength and firmness in the full sense of the word.

This, in brief, is what happened. Fida'i action is from us and we are for it. It was established with our blessing. We support it with all our strength as long as it plays its full part in this battle.

16.54 GMT: Excerpt from report of King Husayn's answers to questions by foreign journalists (read by announcer):

At the end of his press conference King Husayn answered questions by foreign correspondents.



In reply to a question on the date when the Government intended to implement Tuesday's decision banning the carrying and stockpiling of weapons in Jordanian towns, the King said: We do not oppose the carrying or stockpiling of weapons in towns. The carrying and stockpiling of weapons is a basis for defence against any external action. However, there are priorities in arming - first priority must go to the armed forces. Afterwards we will devote ourselves to arming and organising the people in the best possible way.

We do not oppose the arming of the people and have no intention of taking arms away from them... The Government had no intention of provoking the people or limiting their right to resist occupation. However, it wants to ensure organised and united ranks behind our armed forces - ranks which will observe laws and regulations in the public interest.

Asked if he expected the fida'i organisations to obey laws, especially those banning the carrying of arms in cities and villages, King Husayn said: I do not think there is anyone who considers himself above the law...

Asked if it was necessary for the fida'iyyin to observe these laws, he said: I believe everyone must respect laws as much as possible so that we can organise and unite our ranks. All these laws are being revised in good faith to create a better situation.

On a question as to whether things could have been averted had the Government, as some fida'i organisations had suggested, discussed the measures before they were announced, King Husayn said: There has been some misunderstanding. However, the road is still open for an understanding. Perhaps, if there had been an understanding, things would not have occurred. That is why we have decided to suspend the matter and not to proceed with implementation...

Asked if he thought it was necessary to review the general situation in Jordan and Jordan's policy on the cease-fire resolution and the 1967 Security Council resolution, he said: No. However, let us ask: Where is the 1967 Security Council resolution? Unfortunately, this resolution is non-existent. We Arabs have done our best to respect the resolution, but in vain. In my opinion things are not far from all-out war since Israel has disregarded the Security Council resolution and defied the will of nations. All we can now do is to organise ourselves to face future eventualities.

Asked if Jordan accepted the Security Council resolution, he said: Jordan and the UAR have supported the resolution and declared their readiness to implement it. They have done their best to consolidate peace in this area. However, this resolution will remain meaningless so long as Israel refuses to withdraw from the occupied territories.

Asked if he felt pessimistic about the possibility of a new war, his opinion on the role of the big four Powers, and whether there was still hope of peace in the area, King Husayn said: I believe that the big Powers have apparently sponsored a resolution in which they do not believe and of which they do not approve. It is not for me to say what these Powers should do. We are following their efforts but without enthusiasm, or rather with decreasing enthusiasm, since these Powers have not yet achieved any progress towards a settlement of the Middle East crisis. Nevertheless, we encourage the co-operation between these States to achieve a lasting and just peace...

Asked if there were Pakistani forces, including anti-aircraft units, in Jordan and about the manner in which these forces had been dispatched to Jordan, he said: ... Pakistan is a Muslim country. Muslims have rights in Jerusalem and they are not prepared to relinquish them in any circumstances. Moreover, we are facing continuous aggression. The Pakistani force in Jordan is a token force, but it is a symbol of solidarity and support between the two countries. Pakistan, as a Muslim country, has been supporting us ever since the Palestine question arose.



Asked if the front line States' conference had adopted any resolutions on the relationship between the Arab States and the fida'i organisations, he said: I believe that as far as results are concerned the conference was constructive... We did not, however, discuss fida'i action. The UAR and other Arab States do not face the situation as we do in Jordan. It is only natural that there is a Resistance movement in our land because our people are under the yoke of occupation... We hope to support the Resistance fighters wherever they are according to the interest of all the Arab nation.

Asked if the US proposals to Jordan could bring any benefit to Jordan, the King said: I can say that the US plan as it stands is very far from satisfactory... It will be very difficult for us to accept anything which is mere playing with words. Certainly, no resolution will have any meaning so long as Israel does not accept it while at the same time Israel received modern arms... Israel has strengthened itself and has obtained arms and equipment, including Phantoms and Skyhawks. This year alone Israel has allocated more than £400,000,000 sterling for the purchase of new equipment. This figure may not even cover the new Phantoms it is seeking.

Where is the balance of power and where is the moral pressure on Israel to return to its senses and move towards peace? Of what value are the proposals in such conditions, especially since Israel was the first to reject the UN resolutions? How can we expect Israel to return to its senses when it is liberally being given everything it asks for? What should the Arab nation be asked to do in the face of all these challenges?

#### "Voice of Fatah" Broadcasts

(a) "Voice of Fatah" in Arabic 18.30 GMT 14.2.70

(i) Text of talk for bedouin troops in Jordan:

Brother soldiers and officers of the Jordanian Army Bedouin Corps, brothers of the Balqa, Hadid and Sukhur tribes, Thursday's regrettable incident involving the house of Shaykh Muhammad Munawwar al-Hadid, which was a conspiracy to drive a wedge between our fighters and the sons of the Hadid, Balqa and Sukhur, failed to achieve its aim.

A delegation of the unified general command of the fida'i organisations tonight visited Shaykh Muhammad Munawwar al-Hadid to express regret at this scheme and to deprive those who were trying to plot and to sow sedition of the opportunity to do so.

The visit of the delegation developed into a demonstration of support for fida'i action. A majority of the Hadid, Sukhur and Balqa tribesmen participated in this demonstration, which emphasised military solidarity with the revolution and the tribesmen's resolve to fight hand-in-hand with the revolution against the Zionist enemy.

A salute to our brothers, sons of the brave Hadid, Sukhur and Balqa tribes. We implore Almighty God to sponsor our national unity for the day of victory in the battle of destiny. Uphold the revolution, our heroic tribes, until liberation and victory. It is a revolution until victory.

(ii) Excerpts from talk for fida'iyin:

Brother fighters of all fida'i organisations, comrades of our heroic martyr fighters, every popular revolution in the world must inevitably face obstacles... Our Palestine revolution has been surmounting obstacles aimed at containment and subservience, and crises fabricated by counter-forces to break up the forces of the revolution, to distract them from the Zionist enemy, and to preoccupy them with side battles to exhaust their energy and resources...



The obstacles and barriers surmounted by the revolution reflect a number of facts:

(1) Despite the existence of secondary ideological contradictions among some elements of the revolution, the preservation of the revolution and continuation of the struggle against the Zionist enemy must remain above bargaining and differences. This has been demonstrated by all the fida'i organisations in every crisis and in the face of every liquidation plot by imperialism, Zionism and the counter-forces against our revolution.

(2) All the obstacles and barriers surmounted by the revolution must inevitably create absolute conviction, even among those who put up these obstacles and barriers, that the revolution cannot be eradicated and that our revolutionaries cannot be liquidated because the revolution expresses the will of the masses. This will cannot be liquidated; it is bound to win...

(b) "Voice of Fatah" in Arabic 18.30 GMT 15.2.70

(i) Excerpt from call to Jordanians for vigilance against fifth columns:

Brothers in Jordan, brothers in every base, house and street, fifth columns are now trying to spread rumours everywhere after their failure to implement their plans against the revolution and the masses. They are therefore now trying to use the weapon of rumours to arouse and provoke you and urge you to commit a mistake which may serve as a spark to kindle side fires afresh.

My Jordanian brothers, my brothers in every village and town, the masses and the revolution have succeeded because they have been able to distinguish between what serves the plans of the fifth columns and the enemy and what serves the masses and the revolution.

The fifth columns want you to lose the power to distinguish and of self-restraint by spreading a heavy cloud of rumours and intrigues to prevent you from seeing facts and finding the way. You have established the facts, my brothers, by your unity and cohesion with your revolution during the days of the crisis. The way is that of the armed revolution in which you have believed while trying to reach your goals and fulfil your aspirations for victory.

My brother fighters, you should maintain order and obey all instructions and orders issued by your command and not believe any rumour whatever its source. Your command is vigilant and watchful against any eventuality or attempt. The fifth columns, my brother fighters, want to provoke and arouse you by means of rumours and intrigues in order to exploit every individual behaviour, confirm their rumours and achieve the purpose behind the rumours...

(ii) Text of cable to Yasir Arafat from Qa'id Ahmad of Algeria:


The Algerian people and Party have been shocked by the bloody clashes between the Palestine Resistance and the Jordanian security forces in which a number of fida'iyyin, who were prepared by the Palestinian people and the Arab nation to liberate Palestine from the Zionist invaders, have been killed.

In these painful circumstances, all Algerian people once again confirm their absolute support for the Palestinian people and their fighting vanguards. With all their resources, the Algerian people back the Palestinian people and ask all Arab Governments to support and consolidate fida'i activities and support them with all material and military means to escalate the battle until victory is achieved. They appeal to the Arab peoples to be careful and vigilant against intrigues and plots aimed at liquidating the sacred Palestine issue and at imposing defeatist solutions in the interest of imperialism and the Zionist enemy and at the expense of the Palestinian people and the honour of the Arab nation.



Near Eastern Department,

F.C.O.



*With the compliments of*

CHANCERY

Enter 15/1

BRITISH EMBASSY

P.O. BOX 87

AMMAN

9 January, 1970

(Amman tel. No. 19 refers)

Mr. Long

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# JORDAN NEWS AGENCY

Amman — Jordan

MR Lush

(2)

Bulletin No. 1083

Thursday-Jan. 8, 1970

1- Amman , Jan. 8(JNA)-

H.M. King Hussein addressed the following important political speech to the people in both Banks of Jordan and to the Arab Nation:-

Citizens,

Greetings to you all, soldiers and officers of the armed forces, who hoist high the banner and offer blood and safeguard the homeland, men and women in our occupied land facing danger, crushing despair, and keeping the pledge. Young and old in our steadfast land, making miracles, and offering sacrifices for the sake of Jordan, and the honour and dignity of all Arabs.

I am back after a short absence necessitated by circumstances for our issue and for its service during the Arab Summit in Rabat and after it, all on the same level.

I have always been with you, living among you with my spirit and soul. Whenever I heard your news, I shouldered your sufferings, but when I recalled your traits and characteristics my spirit felt calm, and I closed my eyes in peace when I recalled



your sacrifices and steadfastness. Then I felt proud while I believed that the honour of my people is the noblest of all living ranks to be assumed that they are achieving their objectives no matter how long the road is and how dear the path of struggle and sacrifice is.

All my life, I have been tied strongly to every patricle of the soil of this sacred land, with the deepest of love feelings and loyalty, today, I give all the profound feelings of my heart to Irbid and all the villages of the north, for these areas were and still are, the target of enemy fire . day and night.

I recall with pride that all of them have been offering with great generosity the tax of honour and dignity and paying the price of remarkable steadfastness and the genuine adherence to the good land. I pay tribute to the martyrs and hail the valiancy of our heroic soldiers and heroism of our steadfast citizens. I renew the pledge to each one of them that we are proceeding on the path of struggle until victory, and until our people are liberated, our Jerusalem returned and our full sacred right is restored.



Citizens,

of the

I wanted to talk to you about what became/summit conference in Rabat and about the present Arab position. You are in the heart of the battle and not spectators, whether those of you under the occupation or those standing heroically with determination on the struggling positions. You have the right to get acquainted with the facts and know the position and the road. Perhaps the phase did not make it incumbent on us, as leaders and responsables, more than it makes imperative on us to face our peoples with facts and not to obliterate and hide them from our peoples.

We wanted from the conference, when it was scheduled to be held, to review with our brothers the Arab leaders who represent the highest authority of responsibility in the Arab homeland, the Arab attitude from its political, military and economic aspects.

We wished to talk with them on ensuring all ways and means that guarantee the reinforcing of these aspects with joint Arab effort and <sup>the</sup> mobilization of potentials so as to be able to face the stage and its exigencies with what it needs and deserves.

We have drawn up detailed memoranda on the political, military and economic aspects concerning our stand, accompanied by lengthy notes on the military posture and how it was in the



aftermath of the calamity and how it has developed and changed.

We underlined in detail to our brothers the quantity, quality and value of the arms we lost and made good, in addition to our needs to complete arming of our existing military units for defence purposes on the one hand, and to confront the coming stage on the other, in order that we can implement the plans that ensure facing all eventualities and to work towards the recovery of the dear land and smash the aggression grip.

Our notes clarified what we have spent in the sphere of arming, defence and steadfastness. It was clearly illustrated that this struggling Jordanian land which opened its battlefields to the brotherly Arab forces to be stationed on it in defence of the entire Arab existence, is worthy of receiving the battle requirements from the Arab participation in proportion to the great responsibility being carried out by this kingdom and the great national duty which it performs continuously Our notes were parallel and in harmony with the details and requirements presented by the commander of the Eastern and Western fronts.

It was only natural to present all that at the summit confernece. Because the enemy derives the resources of his strength, financing, arming and training from world Zionism and its agencies



as well as from the sources of its influence and pro- quarters  
The enemy evaluates his calculations on the basis that his existence on the Arab land must be based on the destruction of the Arab strength and the crushing of the Arab existence. For consolidating his aggression the enemy is constantly and continuously making available to himself arms, funds and potentials in order to impose his will on the Arabs together with the imposition of a settlement recognizing to him the gains and concessions he is aspiring for. It is enough to note that the enemy announced that he had allocated to this end and under the item of purchasing new arms alone more than 400 million sterling for this year alone. This was in addition to the ground, air and naval weapons he acquainted since June 1967 until now and besides the arms he acquired during the so-called six day war, added to all that the enemy's improvement of his military posture on the land with the help of many natural positions and the ensuring of his defences in the known depth.

From here, it was imperative that we should rely in our strife with the invading enemy on the resources and wealths of the Arab Nation and the arsenal available to it. What made our enemy fight us with the world Zionism close front behind him, offering, sacrificing and moving, should a thousand times more



make our country stand fast and defend with the Arab Nation close front behind its offering, sacrificing and moving too. What enabled the Israeli who came from depth of the East with the Israeli who came from the for West should at least unify the Jordan struggling citizens, whether a soldier or a civilian together with every Arab citizen, a soldier or a civilian in the great Arab homeland before the continued aggression and the invading occupation.

The summit confernece afforded an opportunity for discussion and debate . This was carried out on the bilateral and multilateral level. If the conference did not draft its outcome in a resolution or communique, this does not imply that the conference did not emerge with some limited concrete results. Undoubtedly the picture of the position was presented in a detailed and clear manner, although the actual response to that attitude was no on the desired level.

As for the confernece, I must pay tribute<sup>to</sup> the thankful effort exerted by H.M. King Hassan the Second for making the agenda of the conference succeed and for the warm hospitality accorded by his dear country to the conferences. And further more the sincere brotherly feelings shown by His Majesty, his government and his struggling brotherly people towards us in that genuine Arab country.



However, the limited positive results reached by the Rabat Conference did not define the maximum extent of the joint Arab action for confronting the armed Israeli aggression. Gatherings between each state and the other will take place one day as well as meetings between a number of brothers or between them all.

As we are looking forward<sup>to</sup> the imminent summit meeting of the front-line countries to which many important matters are attached, bilateral contacts will continue between our capitals in order to achieve further coordination, cooperation and linking. I would like here to reiterate and reaffirm that close coordination between us and the United Arab Republic will always exist, grow and enhance, promoted by equality in passion and endorsed by unity of thinking, determination and trend.

Hence the result we had from the summit conference will deepen our knowledge of our real big role in the battle of destiny and will add new dimensions to the great responsibilities we are shouldering in our struggle to regain our land, our Jerusalem and to the triumph of our dear right, so and despite everything, and in spite of our commitment to peace on the basis of justice.



We shall not take any measure or act unilaterally, and we shall not yield to settlements which <sup>do</sup> not give us back all our occupied lands, and all our usurped rights. This was our stand and attitude in our political efforts, and this will be our stand in all fields. What we seek to achieve by liberation, we do not refuse to achieve by peaceful means, but all that is impossible to achieve by peaceful means will be achieved by liberation.

Dear Citizens,

We are . a grave stage of our bitter struggle, in which the trying enemy is / to deal harsh and violent blows . But we, to the last drop of our blood, and by the smallest piece of arms in our hands, will stand in his face, and check his ugly occupation and his incessant aggression.

This attitude of ours imposes on us to be more steadfast further and to offer/sacrifices, it also deepens/cements our national unity. Any breach in our national front on the East or the West Banks of our eternal River, or any split in opinion or separation in direction, will stab our national struggle at its inner heart, and will weaken the strength of our entity which was deep-rooted by the unity of our blood and destiny, by the Almighty .



It is rather sad that we indulge ourselves in thinking of what will happen after liberation before we concern ourselves with making ready for liberation. We are now in the heart of the most fierce battle that our nation ever faced in its long history, the battle itself will outline and decide whether we are "to be or not to be".

We are here in this steadfast struggling state, living every minute of the battle and stung by fire day and night. I have vowed to God and pledged to you to stay together and die honourably or achieve decisive victory. Leadership, my brothers was handed to me in this long, difficult march soaked in blood. I accepted responsibility and assumed the task so that I shall carry you, my dear brothers in both Banks, to the shores of safety and the grounds of liberation.

I shall not hesitate or be reluctant in the process of our march, I shall accept no deviation from the path, no rebellion against our national will, and no separation from our national unity and no attempt to distort it.

I shall not accept any contradictions in means or ends or anything that may be out of the sphere of the battle or away from the aim of liberation. My responsibility is to shoulder the burden of leadership, and I am shouldering it, and my duty is to achieve the aim of our struggle and I am working for it.



You have all moved hand in hand to build and establish a concrete structure so that you have become an example to be followed despite lack in resources and repeated crises. Your faith in unity has become stronger when the enemy usurped a part of your holy soil and when martyrs from both Banks fell resisting the enemy on the path of freedom and liberation.

When the day in which we restore our dignity and achieve victory comes, the nation will choose its way, decide its destiny and chooses the life it favours.

In order to reach that day we shall reject all attempts to split our ranks. We shall accept no crack on whatever terms, theories or propaganda. Our struggle against the enemy is a long and bitter one, and if we are sincere to our cause and seek truth in dealing with the world, then we can move from victory to victory until we restore our right and homeland. Otherwise we shall move from defeat to defeat until the enemy achieves all his ends.

I explained all these facts to my brothers the Arab leaders in Rabat, I assured them that I shall never abandon my people in the West Bank or leave them prey to dreams and illusions. The right we seek to restore is that of the Palestinians, but the cause is that of all Arabs, it is the cause of Arab destiny, and therefore it is the duty of the Arab Nation not to shake off responsibility, but to stick to it and defend Arab right, entity and destiny.



We had proceeded to this aim with faith, and we shall carry on as such. We shall accept no split and no weakening. Liberation is our holiest duty to accomplish, and this we shall achieve depending on the unity of our people and its readiness to sacrifice, and depending on the support and good will of our Arab Nation. We shall never hesitate to sacrifice in blood and soul for our cause. Our utter faith in the victory of our right will never weaken no matter how much tyranny persists.

XXXXXX

END



# SUMMARY OF World BROADCASTS.

King Husayn's Broadcast of 8th January

Amman home service in Arabic 19.00 GMT 8. 1.70

Text of broadcast by King Husayn (live or from a recording):

In the name of God the Merciful, the Compassionate. Brothers, I send greetings of love and loyalty to every one of you - men and officers of the armed forces who are raising the banner, sacrificing blood and protecting the country; men and women in our occupied territory who are resisting the enemy and overcoming despair; the old and young in our steadfast land who are performing miracles and sacrificing their lives for the sake of Jordan's glory and the honour and dignity of all the Arab people.

ME/3275/A/7

Here I am, back after a brief absence made necessary by reasons serving the cause, both during and after the Rabat summit conference. As usual, I thought of you all the time. Whenever I received reports from the area I worried about you, but then I remembered your great character and I felt reassured, knowing that you will continue to resist and sacrifice. I was proud of you, because I believe that to my people honour is the most valuable thing in life. Indeed, I felt reassured that my people will achieve their objective regardless of the long struggle and heavy sacrifices.

Although I have great love and loyalty for every part of this holy land, today my whole heart and being is turned to Irbid and all the towns in our northern region, which like other regions of our country are the target of enemy rockets and fire day and night. I am proud to say that all these areas have given and continue to give with great generosity, the toll of honour and dignity; they continue to pay the price of mighty resistance and genuine attachment to the good land. I pray for our righteous martyrs, hail the bravery of our heroic soldiers and the courage of our steadfast citizens, and renew the pledge to every one of them that we will continue along the path of struggle until final victory, God willing. We shall liberate our people, recover Jerusalem, and regain the legitimate rights in full.

Brother citizens, I want to speak to you about the Rabat summit conference and the present Arab situation. You are not spectators but in the heart of the battle, whether you are in the occupied territory or at the front line. You have every right to know the facts, and to know the situation and the course. The present stage demands that we, as leaders and responsible men, must tell our people the facts, not hide them.

We called the conference to review with our brother Arab leaders - who represent the highest responsible authorities in the great homeland - the Arab situation from the political, military and economic points of view. We wanted to discuss with them the means to ensure the success of the common Arab effort in these fields and to mobilise resources and capabilities to enable us to deal with the present phase and its requirements.

For our part, we submitted memoranda on the political, military and economic conditions in Jordan. We accompanied these memoranda with detailed reports on the military situation during the setback and how it has changed and developed. We told our brothers the quantity, type and value of the arms we lost and have replaced. We also told them what arms we require to complete the armament of our existing military units for defence and to deal with the next stage, so enabling us to implement plans for every eventuality, recover the dear land and eliminate the aggression.

Our reports dealt with our expenditure in armament, defence and steadfastness. It was obvious to all that this struggling Jordanian land, which has let in fraternal Arab forces to help defend the whole Arab existence, deserves Arab aid commensurate with its great responsibility and national duty. Our reports were also harmonious and in line with the reports and requirements submitted by the Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern and Western Fronts. It was only natural for us to state all our requirements to the summit conference because the enemy is reinforced, supplied, armed and trained by world Zionism and its institutions, centres of influence and supporters. The enemy realises that a continuation of his presence on Arab territory must be based on the destruction of Arab strength and the crushing of the Arab existence.

To support his aggression, the enemy ensures that he is continually supplied with arms, money and resources to enable him to impose his terms on the Arabs and impose the settlement which will secure for him gains and privileges. It is enough to say that this year alone the enemy has allocated over £400,000,000 sterling for the purchase of new arms. This is in addition to the land, air and naval weapons he has obtained since June 1967, and the weapons he captured during the so-called six-day war. Furthermore, the enemy has strengthened his military position on the ground by occupying many natural strategic positions thereby guaranteeing his defence through distance.



ME/3275/A/3

For this reason we have had to depend on the Arab nation's resources and arms in our conflict with this occupier enemy. The same thing that has enabled our enemy to fight us - the backing of the solid front of world Zionism by giving, sacrificing and moving - should enable our country to stand fast and defend itself with the backing of the solid front of the Arab nation also by giving, sacrificing and moving a thousand times more. What has united Israelis from the far east of Israel to the far west should also unite the steadfast Jordanian, soldier or civilian, with every Arab, soldier or civilian, in the great Arab homeland.

There was a great deal of discussion at the summit conference about the bilateral and general levels. Although the conference did not announce its results in a statement, this does not mean that it did not achieve some useful things and some limited positive results. The situation was explained quite clearly, but the actual response to this situation was not what one would have wished for.

I must commend the praiseworthy efforts of brother King Hassan II in working to make the conference a success, the overwhelming hospitality his dear country accorded to the conferees and above all the sincere fraternal feelings which His Majesty, his Government and fraternal people have for us in this noble Arab land.

Nevertheless, although the conference did achieve limited positive results, it did not specify what should be the maximum level of common Arab action in facing the armed Israeli aggressions.

Meetings will continue between the fraternal Arab States at the bilateral or collective levels. Until the front line States summit conference, which will soon take place to deal with many important matters, bilateral contacts will continue between Arab capitals to achieve greater co-ordination, co-operation and liaison.

I want to repeat and stress that the firm co-ordination between us and the fraternal UAR will continue to grow and develop, God willing, nurtured by equal feelings and common thinking, resolve and harmony. The outcome of the summit conference was that we are now more aware of the reality of our great role in the crucial battle and of the new dimensions of the enormous responsibilities we are meeting in our brave struggle to regain our land, our Jerusalem and our previous right.

Although we are committed to work for peace based on right and justice, by God we will not take any unilateral step or action or give way to settlements which do not return to us the whole occupied territory and the whole usurped right.

This was our position presented in our diplomatic efforts and this will continue to be our position in other respects. What we want through liberation we will not reject through peace, and what we are denied through peace we will achieve through liberation.

Brother citizens, we are, then, in a serious stage of our bitter struggle in which the enemy is attempting to strike violently, cruelly and arrogantly. We are attempting to maintain steadfastness in the face of the enemy and to undermine the pillars of the obnoxious occupation and [word indistinct] aggression with even the smallest weapon in our hands and to the last drop of our blood. This position obliges us to strengthen our national unity, establish it, stabilise its links and implement it, just as our position imposes on us more steadfastness and sacrifice. Any disintegration in the national front on the east and west of the immortal river, any division of opinion, and any deviation in direction will only stab the national struggle in the heart and undermine the foundation of this existence, which was inspired by the unity of blood and destiny, which was built with life's bitterness and sweetness and which God's hand has blessed for us.

It is truly regrettable that we are preoccupied more with what must be done after liberation than with work and preparation for the liberation. We are in the midst of the severest battle in the Arab nation's long history. It is the battle whose outcome will decide whether we shall or shall not exist. We here in this struggling steadfast country live the battle minute by minute, and are licked by its fire day and night. We have pledged to God that we shall endure its hardships until it ends with either dear martyrdom or decisive victory.



Brothers, I have been entrusted with leadership in this long and hard march, with its blood, steel and iron. I have accepted the responsibility and faced the mission to lead you, dear ones in both banks, to the shores of safety and land of liberation. I shall, therefore, not allow any hesitation in continuing the march, any deviation from the course, any rebellion against the national will, or any separation from the national unity or distortion of this unity. I shall not accept any opposition in trends or methods, or whatever may direct these trends or methods outside the battle or divert them from the liberation objective. My responsibility is to assume the responsibilities of leadership. I am assuming them. My duty is also to achieve the objective of struggle, and I am doing this. People, you have marched with a firm and reciprocal unity of all the citizens of this Kingdom, you have built and reconstructed despite the shortage of resources and the succession of crises, until you have become an example. The enemy has struck you swept away a part of your holy soil, and gained domination over a section of the faithful sons, but the doctrine of unity has become more deeply entrenched and established in you, and your ties of solidarity have become stronger. Your martyrs everywhere appealed, so you took up resistance, intensified it and moved forward in a huge procession of steadfastness calling for a meeting with freedom and liberation in the near future.

When the day comes for us to restore our dignity and achieve our victory, the people will choose their way, determine their fate and select for themselves the way of life they desire. Our simplest duty in reaching that day is to reject any attempt - no matter how it is expressed or what theory or propaganda is used to disintegrate our unity and divide our ranks. Our struggle with our enemies is long and bitter. The truer we are ourselves, to our issue and to the world, the better we can lead the struggle from victory to victory until we recover our right and restore our homeland by our contributions and sacrifices, God willing. Otherwise, we shall continue in the struggle and move from one stumbling-block to another until our enemies achieve all their ambitions, may God forbid.

I explained all these facts to my brother leaders in Rabat and assured them that my manly virtues do not permit me to give up my people and brothers in the occupied territory and leave them and others to the mercy of dreams and illusions. The Palestinian people are the rightful owners but the issue is that of the whole Arab nation and its fate, and it is the nations' duty not to give up its responsibilities but to stand sincerely and honourably to defend right, existence and fate.

It was with this conviction and faith that we began marching towards our objectives, and we will continue on the course to the end. There is no place in our ranks for tampering, division or negligence. There is no duty before us more sacred than the duty of liberation. We will carry out this duty depending on the solidarity of our unified people, their sacrifices and the sympathies of our Arab nation and its support to us. Our readiness to sacrifice soul and blood for the issue will never for one moment falter, and our absolute faith in the victory of our right will never weaken no matter how deeply tyranny strikes its roots. May God's peace, mercy and blessings be with you.

#### Ba'th Party Statement on the Rabat Summit

Damascus home service in Arabic 19.15 GMT 8.1.70

Excerpts from announcer read statement by the Ba'th Party National Command on the fifth Arab summit conference:

~~The Fifth Arab summit conference was held in an Arab and international atmosphere whose political outlines are certainly known to everyone among our Arab people, and especially to those who follow political questions... In view of the international conditions in which the most important Arab questions of destiny are being deliberated, and in view of the interest the Arab masses have been showing in these conditions, it has become the duty of our Party again to explain its attitude.~~



EN CLAIR  
ROUTINE AMMAN  
TELNO 19

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
9 JANUARY 1970

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RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No. 10  
12 JAN 1970

KING HUSSEIN'S SPEECH.  
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NEM 3/44/1

KING HUSSEIN MADE A TELEVISION SPEECH TO THE NATION  
8 JANUARY. FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF THE MAIN POINTS:-

2. HE RENEWED HIS PLEDGE TO PROCEED WITH THE STRUGGLE  
"UNTIL VICTORY, THE LIBERATION OF OUR PEOPLE, THE RETURN  
OF JERUSALEM AND THE RESTORATION OF OUR HOLY RIGHTS IN  
FULL".

3. ARAB SUMMIT.  
-----

HE HAD GONE TO THE SUMMIT TO TALK WITH THE ARAB LEADERS  
ABOUT THE MOBILISATION OF ARAB RESOURCES. HE HAD TAKEN WITH  
HIM DETAILED NOTES ON JORDAN'S MILITARY POSITION, ON THE  
QUANTITY AND QUALITY OF THE ARMS LOST AND MADE GOOD AND ON  
JORDAN'S NEEDS TO COMPLETE THE ARMING OF HER MILITARY UNITS  
BOTH FOR DEFENCE AND TO WORK TOWARDS THE RECOVERY OF THE  
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. THOSE NOTES WERE IN COMPLETE HARMONY  
WITH THE DETAILS AND REQUIREMENTS PRESENTED TO THE SUMMIT BY  
THE COMMANDER OF THE EASTERN AND WESTERN FRONTS (GENERAL FAWZI).  
JUST AS THE ISRAELIS RELIED ON THE BACKING OF WORLD ZIONISM  
SO THE JORDANIANS HAD TO RELY ON THE RESOURCES AND WEALTH OF  
THE WHOLE ARAB NATION. THE RESPONSE OF THE SUMMIT WAS NOT AT  
THE LEVEL THEY HAD HOPED FOR ALTHOUGH IT DID HAVE SOME LIMITED  
POSITIVE RESULTS. THE SUMMIT MADE CLEAR HOW BIG A ROLE JORDAN  
WOULD HAVE TO PLAY IN THE BATTLE AND ADDED NEW DIMENSIONS  
TO THE RESPONSIBILITIES JORDAN MUST SHOULDER.

4. KING HUSSEIN PAID TRIBUTE TO KING HASSAN OF MOROCCO  
BOTH FOR HIS HOSPITALITY AND FOR THE FRIENDLY ATTITUDE SHOWN  
BY HIM AND HIS PEOPLE.

5. FURTHER CONTACTS.

12/1 22.1

/THE FORTHCOMING



THE FORTHCOMING SUMMIT MEETING OF FRONT LINE STATES WOULD BE PRECEDED BY BILATERAL CONTACTS WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON CLOSE CO-ORDINATION BETWEEN JORDAN AND THE UAR.

6. PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.  
-----

JORDAN WOULD NOT ACT UNILATERALLY. IT WOULD NOT AGREE TO ANY SETTLEMENT WHICH DID NOT RESTORE ALL THE OCCUPIED TERRITORY. 'WHAT WE SEEK TO ACHIEVE BY LIBERATION, WE DO NOT REFUSE TO ACHIEVE BY PEACEFUL MEANS, BUT THAT WHICH WE CANNOT ACHIEVE BY PEACEFUL MEANS WILL BE ACHIEVED BY LIBERATION'.

7. NATIONAL UNITY  
-----

KING HUSSEIN AFFIRMED THAT HE HAD ACCEPTED THE RESPONSIBILITY TO LEAD HIS PEOPLE TO LIBERATION. IN THIS HE WOULD ACCEPT NO DEVIATION FROM THE NATIONAL WILL AND NO DIVISION OF NATIONAL UNITY. IT WAS A SHAME THAT PEOPLE INDULGED IN THINKING OF WHAT WOULD HAPPEN AFTER LIBERATION BEFORE THINKING OF PREPARATIONS FOR LIBERATION. AFTER LIBERATION THE NATION WOULD CHOOSE ITS OWN WAY BUT UNTIL THEN HE WOULD REJECT ALL ATTEMPTS TO SPLIT RANKS, ALL THEORISING AND PROPAGANDA.

8. ARAB UNITY  
-----

THE RIGHTS TO BE RESTORED WERE THE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINE PEOPLE, BUT THE CAUSE WAS THAT OF THE WHOLE ARAB NATION: IT WAS THE DUTY OF THE ARAB NATION NOT TO ABANDON ITS RESPONSIBILITY.

9. FULL TEXT FOLLOWS BY BAG TO F.C.O. ONLY.

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SIR P. ADAMS

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